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To Tell the Truth:
Public Employee First Amendment Rights in Providing Testimony
Kate Potter
Grand Valley State University
Abstract
The ideals set forth in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights encapsulate what it
means to be an American citizen: freedom. However, this freedom is not absolute. ince its
inception, the judicial system has placed limits on this freedom in order to balance the freedom
of speech of some against the freedoms of life, liberty, and happiness of others. One area
in which these limits have been placed concerns the Freedom of Speech of public employees.
The Supreme Court has issued rulings which have sought to find a balance between the rights
of the employee and the rights of the employer. In attempting to find this balance, the Court
has dissected the public employee into two distinct personas: employee and citizen. The Court
has failed to recognize that there are specific times when employee speech cannot be separated
from citizen speech, namely in giving sworn truthful testimony. The following analysis tracks
the historical jurisprudence of the First Amendment free speech rights of public employees to
determine the current constitutional protections for public employees who provide sworn truthful
testimony as part of their official job duties. This analysis will also suggest a judicial and
administrative rule that should be implemented to ensure that public employees are protected
when giving testimony on behalf of their employers.
Introduction
The ideals set forth in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights
encapsulate what it means to be an American citizen: freedom. One of the most
significant aspects of the First Amendment is the freedom of speech. This
freedom is engrained into the psyche of the American public, and is sought
by immigrants traveling across American borders. As with anything, however,
freedom of speech is not an absolute. Since its inception, the judicial system has
placed limits on this freedom in order to balance the freedom of speech of some
against the freedoms of life, liberty, and happiness of others. “While the
language of the amendment appears unambiguous, the United States Supreme
Court has nevertheless grappled with numerous constitutional questions on
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the breadth of the amendment. The court has been forced to balance the
importance of protecting free speech, with ensuring that some limits on hateful,
hurtful, or potentially dangerous speech exists” (Dallago, 2016, p. 240).
For public employees, the conflict that resides within the freedom of speech
listed in the First Amendment is centered on the employee’s identity as a citizen
and as a public employee, as well as the employer’s identity as a government
agency and as an employer. Court cases involving freedom of speech have
created different classes of speech. Each category is given a different level of
scrutiny dependent upon the value society places on this speech (Farley, 2007, p.
608). “The least valuable speech, such as public employee speech, is protected by
rational basis scrutiny, which requires the government to merely have a legitimate
interest in suppressing the speech and that the restriction be reasonably related
to that interest” (Farley, 2007, p. 609). It is based on this low level of scrutiny
that public employees find their freedom of speech limited by the public
agencies that employ them.
A little over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court began creating a complex
system of analysis to determine which public employee speech is protected
under the First Amendment. The Court sought to find a balance between the
rights of the employee and the rights of the employer. In attempting to find
this balance, the Court has dissected the public employee into two distinct
personas: employee and citizen. The Court has failed to recognize that there are
specific times when employee speech cannot be separated from citizen speech,
namely in giving sworn truthful testimony. The Court has determined that
citizen speech when spoken on a matter of public concern is protected by the
First Amendment (Pickering, 1968; Connick, 1983; Garcetti, 2006). The Court,
however, has refused to address employee speech when it is given as part of
the employee’s official duties. Although, the Court has stated that employees
who give sworn testimony outside of normal duties, even if the testimony
pertains to information the employee learned on the job, the testimonial speech
is constitutionally protected (Lane, 2014). The Court has failed to protect
employees who are required to testify as part of their ordinary duties, such
as police officers, crime scene technicians, and child welfare workers. These
employees have been placed in a precarious position when testifying on matters
concerning their jobs and employers when the potential testimony is damaging
to the employer: testify truthfully and face retaliation from the employer or
commit perjury and face criminal repercussions from the judicial system. The
following analysis tracks the historical jurisprudence of the First Amendment
free speech rights of public employees to determine the current constitutional
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commit perjury and face criminal repercussions from the judicial system. The
following analysis tracks the historical jurisprudence of the First Amendment
free speech rights of public employees to determine the current constitutional
protections for public employees who provide sworn truthful testimony as
part of their official job duties. This analysis will also suggest a judicial and
administrative rule that should be implemented to ensure that public employees
are protected when giving testimony on behalf of their employers.
Dichotomies of Public Employment
Public entities find themselves in a unique and precarious position. Unlike
private companies, public agencies are bound to uphold the rights guaranteed
within the Constitution, while simultaneously operating a business-like operation
that provides services for the citizens of the United States. As with any
employer, government agencies must be able to operate in the most efficient and
effective way possible. This includes exerting control over the responsibilities
and duties of their employees. “Government, like any employer, needs greater
authority over its employees than it can exercise over is clients, customers, or the
general public” (Rosenbloom, 2015, p. 48). The dichotomy of the government
agency to act as both sovereign and employer can bring conflict between its need
to function efficiently and the First Amendment freedoms of its employees.
Like their employers, public employees also find themselves in a unique
position. Public employers depend on the expertise of their employees to
implement and enforce the laws of the state or nation. The expertise of these
employees is required for the agency or department to run efficiently and to
provide services for the public. This expertise is also required for democracy
to operate at its fullest extent in representing the whole of society. Public
employees must utilize their knowledge and expertise in their respective fields
to “…practice bureaucratic representation…” which “…involves the exercise
of ‘constructive discretion’ by bureaucrats, which consists of conveying insights
gained during the process of implementation to policy makers as a source of
appropriately adjusted content” (Goodsell, 2005, p. 33). It is in this role of policy
implementer that public employees are in the best position to have knowledge
and a comprehensive understanding of the employer’s operations. This position
gives the employee insight as to behavior of the employer that, in terms of
accountability to the public, is inefficient and potentially corrupt and damaging.
It becomes the responsibility of these employees to bring these valuable and
necessary pieces of information to the public. This responsibility, however, is
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counteracted by fear that the employee will face retaliation for speaking
on subjects that could be detrimental to the employer. This fear becomes
apparent when the employee’s responsibilities as an employee, collide with their
responsibilities as a citizen.
As citizens, we have responsibilities to our states and nation. It is a citizen’s
responsibility to participate in the democratic process, obey the laws of the
government, and participate in the judicial process when called upon. It is the
responsibility of each citizen to aid in police investigations and provide sworn
truthful testimony when required. Public employees do not relinquish these
responsibilities when they accept public employment. These responsibilities are
compounded with their responsibilities as an employee. The responsibility of
a citizen is intrinsically linked to a public employee’s responsibility to provide
sworn testimony when subpoenaed as a citizen or as a public employee. “Every
citizen-irrespective of employment status-bears the obligation to provide
truthful testimony whenever he or she takes the stand. This is a legal duty and
one not easily escaped. Because of this duty, it is necessary to recognize the
concurrent roles the employee occupies when testifying before an adjudicatory
body: government employee and citizen” (Deloney, 2016, p. 171).
Public Employee Speech: Precedent Setting Jurisprudence
Prior to the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
issued decisions that stripped public employees of their Constitutional rights.
They operated under what became known as the “privilege doctrine”. “Simply,
the doctrine held that because no public employee had a constitutional right
to a public job, a public employer may impose upon the public employee any
requirement it sees fit as conditional to employment” (Roberts, 2007, p. 173). It
was not until the late 1960s that the Court began to recognize and respect the
dichotomy of a public employee as both an employee, as well as a citizen. The
Court began to balance the interest of the employee with the interest of the
employer.
The government is an employer. As an employer, it must be able to run its
business in a way that is both efficient and effective for its stakeholders while
remaining accountable to the citizens it serves. “Government employers need
some leeway when dealing with their employees. After all, the primary function
of a government agency is to provide efficient services to the public, and if a
government employer were second guessed every time it disciplined a public
employee, services could grind to a halt” (Hudson, 2002, p. 2).
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The right of the government, as employer, to maintain efficient operation of its
business, however, does not give the government carte blanche over deciding
what their employees can or cannot express. A public employee is also a citizen,
and therefore entitled to certain First Amendment protections. A key turning
point in the First Amendment Protection for public employees came in the 1968
ruling of Pickering v. Board of Education.
Pickering v. Board of Education
In 1968, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision concerning
the Freedom of Speech rights of public employees. Marvin L. Pickering
was a teacher from Illinois. After writing a letter to his local newspaper
expressing concern and criticism over the way in which the school board and
superintendent allocated school funds, Pickering was terminated from his
position (Pickering v. Board of Education, 1968). Pickering filed suit against the
board of education citing infringement of his first amendment rights.
The majority opinion for the case established a new criterion for judging
whether or not a public employees’ speech could be protected on constitutional
grounds. The Court rejected the concept that a public employee’s freedom of
speech was uniformly denied based solely on their chosen profession (Pickering
v. Board of Ed., 1968). Citizens do not forgo their constitutional rights when
they procure employment with a government employer. The Court ruled that
although Pickering was a public employee, he was not speaking as a public
employee when he wrote and submitted the letter. Instead, he was a citizen
expressing an opinion on a matter of public concern, in this case school funding
and spending.
…It cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in
regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees” (Pickering v. Board of Ed., 1968).
With those words, the Pickering balancing test was born. In determining if speech
made by a public employee is protected by the First Amendment, courts need to
determine if the employee’s interest as a citizen speaking about a matter
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of public concern outweighed the interest of the employer to run an efficient
organization (Deloney, 2016, p. 715).
In Pickering the Court made clear that public employees do not forfeit their
First Amendment rights based solely upon their choice of employer (Cooper
2006, p. 74). Although, not the first case to address the freedom of speech
of public employees, Pickering established the balance test against which other
freedom of speech cases would be judged.
Based on the Pickering test, the needs of both the employee and employer
are balanced. A government agency is able to protect its quality of services
by limiting speech that is injurious and not useful to the public. At the same
time, public employees, as citizens, are able to provide valuable and insightful
information to protect the public when situations call for it. An appropriate
balance has been met which protects “…the creation and dissemination of
valuable and necessary information to the public- to protect matters of public
concern…If public employees are not able to speak on these matters, the
community will be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues”
(Farley, 2007, p. 623).
Connick v. Myers
If Pickering v. Board of Education created a balance between the public
employer’s need to operate as an efficient business, and the public employee’s
right to speak freely as a citizen, Connick v. Myers was the tipping point on the
balancing scale. The Pickering test created a balance between the interests of the
employer and the employee. In Connick, an additional test was added to the battle
over freedom of speech.
In 1980, Sheila Myers, an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans was
informed that she was being transferred to a different section of the District
Attorney’s office. Highly dissatisfied with the transfer, Myers composed a survey
“…concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for grievance
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt
pressured to work in political campaigns” (Connick v. Myers, 1983). Myers was
terminated after distributing the questionnaire to her coworkers.
The majority opinion in Connick created a preliminary test that would now
have to be applied to freedom of speech disputes concerning public employees.
The Court found that only when an employee’s speech involved a matter of
public concern would it be subjected to the Pickering balancing test. “When
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
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political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by
the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment” (Connick v. Myers, 1983).
To determine if speech would pass the new public concern threshold, the
Court indicated that the speech’s content, form, and context must be examined
(Robertson, 2016, p. 297). The Connick decision “…indicated that if the content
involves a larger audience, possibly outside the workplace, the speech is more
likely to be protected. If the speech appears more like a disgruntled employee
complaining about personal employment issues, the less likely the speech will be
protected” (Robertson, 2016, p. 297)
In Connick, the Court emphasized that a public employee’s free speech rights
only protect speech that regards matters of public concern. The new public
concern test would have to be passed prior to the court weighing the speech in
the Pickering test. By creating a new tier to the balancing test, the Court places
stricter limits on public employees’ right to speak freely by indicating that
protection would only cover matters of public concern (Alter, 1984, p.173).
Unfortunately, the Court left open the definition of “public concern,” and
the decision of what should or should not be considered public concern remains
a subjective matter that employers and the courts can use to arbitrarily restrict
the speech rights of employees. “Equally disturbing is the Connick majority’s
willingness to rely upon the employer’s view that the employee’s actions will be
detrimental to office functioning, rather than ‘make their own appraisal of the
effects of the speech in question.’ In the absence of any tangible evidence of
disruption, the Court will rely upon the employer’s estimation of the harmful
effects of the speech” (Alter, 1984, p. 195). A perceived disruption should not
be grounds for disciplinary action. The Connick Court gave the employer greater
grounds in limiting employee speech. Essentially, an employee’s speech can be
deemed unprotected if a direct connection to public concern is not made, and
the employer believes a future disruption could occur.
Garcetti v. Ceballos
The unbalance created by Connick v. Myers was further exacerbated by the
Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Richard Ceballos was an employee with
the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office. During the course of his normal
duties, Ceballos was asked to review an affidavit that was used to obtain a search
warrant for a criminal case. During his review of the case, Ceballos found
inaccuracies in the affidavit. Ceballos informed his supervisors of his findings
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and prepared a memorandum recommending that the involved case be
dismissed. Despite his concerns and recommendations, the case preceded to trial,
where Ceballos was called to testify about his observations (Garcetti v. Ceballos,
2006). “Ceballos claims that in the aftermath of these events he was subjected
to a series of retaliatory employment actions. The actions included reassignment
from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another
courthouse, and denial of a promotion” (Garcetti v. Ceballos, 2006).
In Pickering, the Court previously found that if a public employee spoke on
a matter of public concern, as a citizen, the speech could be protected under
the First Amendment (Pickering v. Board of Ed., 1968). The Court in Garcetti
focused on whether or not the speech was made as a citizen. They found that
if the speech was made as a public employee, the speech was then outside the
scope of the First Amendment. “We hold that when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline” (Garcetti v. Ceballos,
2006). Under the Garcetti ruling, the content, form, and context of the speech
established in the Connick public concern test (Connick v. Myers, 1983) is moot if
the speech was made as part of the employee’s official job duties.
In Garcetti, the Court drew the proverbial line in the sand between the public
employee’s job as a civil servant, and their role as a citizen. Public employees
hold knowledge and information learned through their positions that are
inherently a matter of public concern. Any speech made pursuant to their job
duties would, therefore, seem to pass the public concern test, and the decision
over whether the speech was protected would fall to the Pickering test. However,
in Garcetti, another test was added which distinguished between speech made
as a citizen and speech made as an employee. “The majority reasons that when
a government employee goes to work and performs those tasks which he has
been paid to perform, he is not acting ‘as a citizen,’ but as an employee of the
government. As a government employee one is not vested with the right to
perform a job as one sees fit” (Cooper, 2006, p. 87). The Court justified this
stance by stating that there was no precedent for having judicial review of
human resource matters (Garcetti v. Ceballos, 2006) and that it is within the
employer’s rights to review their employees work product and performance
(Garcetti v. Ceballos, 2006).
The Garcetti Court further acknowledged that public employees are at the
center of exposing governmental inefficiency and corruption. However, as this
knowledge would be learned pursuant to an employee’s job duties, the speech
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falls outside the jurisdiction of the First Amendment. The Court stated that
the legislature was the proper arena to address such issues by public employees,
not the court system. “Exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct
is a matter of considerable significance…The dictates of sound judgement
are reinforced by the powerful network of legislative enactments-such as
whistleblower protection laws and labor codes-available to those who seek to
expose wrongdoing” (Garcetti v. Ceballos, 2006). What the Court naively did not
take into account when making such a broad and sweeping statement concerning
employee speech is that while it is true that both state and federal governments
have laws pertaining to whistleblowing, many of these laws, however, “…contain
serious gaps and omissions. More often than not, an employee who engages
in whistleblowing speech will quickly find herself in the unemployment line”
(Krotoszynski, 2018, p.299). Furthermore, the Court put too much faith in the
people responsible for writing these laws. The Court ignored the fact that those
responsible for writing the laws are often motivated to keep the information
learned by these public employees quiet (Kitrosser 2019, p. 1700).
Although the Garcetti decision may have been made to preserve and protect
the governments autonomy in its function as an employer, the decision was far
reaching and overly broad. It failed to consider that, by nature, the speech made
by a public employee may be of the utmost importance and value to the public
based on the employee’s knowledge and role within the government. The ruling
has allowed public employers to place further limitations on employee speech,
even if that speech may be the most valuable of all.
Public Employee Testimony
The outcome of the Garcetti case has left public employees in a precarious
position which may be detrimental to some of the core functions of democracy.
If, according to Garcetti, any speech a public employee makes in the course of his
or her job functions is unprotected speech, what happens when that employee
is called to testify in court as an employee? What happens to the employee if
the employer considers the sworn testimony to be averse to the efficiency of the
government agency? Based on the decision that the Garcetti Court made, a public
employee must decide between testifying truthfully under oath, risking discipline,
including termination, or perjury. “In order for the judicial system to function
properly, people must have confidence that the system is just. Failure to protect
someone who has been called to testify may compromise the truthfulness of his
or her testimony” (Dallago, 2016, p. 268).
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Lane v. Franks
Edward Lane worked as the director of Community Intensive Training
for Youth (CITY) with the Central Alabama Community College (CACC).
During the course of a financial audit, Lane discovered that an Alabama state
representative was on CITY’s payroll, however, she had not been performing
any duties with the organization. Lane fired the state representative, which drew
the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After further investigation,
the representative was charged with mail fraud and theft. During her trial, Lane
was subpoenaed to testify concerning his audit and reasoning for terminating the
representative from CITY (Lane v. Franks, 2014). Shortly after testifying, Lane’s
supervisor, Steve Franks, terminated 29 probationary employees, including Lane,
due to financial difficulties of the organization. The terminations, however, were
all rescinded expect for Lane and one other employee. Lane sued Franks citing
infringement on his First Amendment Rights. He contended that the termination
was retaliation for testifying in the trial of the state representative (Lane v.
Franks, 2014).
In deciding whether or not Lane’s testimony was protected speech, the
Court aimed to clarify what the Garcetti Court had previously deemed outside
the scope of Constitutional protection by stating that speech made “pursuant
to” one’s job was not protected. The Lane Court stated that the speech in the
Garcetti case was fundamentally different from the speech in the Lane case (Lane
v. Franks, 2014). In Garcetti the speech involved a memorandum that was written
as part of Ceballos’s ordinary job duties. In Lane, the testimony he provided was
based on information he learned during his official duties, however, testifying
was not a part of those duties. “In other words, the mere fact that a citizen’s
speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public employment
does not transform that speech into employee-rather than citizen-speech. The
critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily
within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those
duties” (Lane v. Franks, 2014). The Court thus limited the scope of Garcetti, by
stating that speech about job duties does not automatically classify the speech as
employee speech.
Although the Court in Lane narrowed the scope of what is considered
employee speech, the Court failed to go far enough in its decision. In the
majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor acknowledges that “Sworn testimony in
judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a
simple reason: anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and
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society at large, to tell the truth” (Lane v. Franks, 2014). Testimonial speech is
citizen speech regardless of who is providing the testimony. Public employees
are citizens and their testimonial speech should be protected under the First
Amendment. The Court recognized this fact, however, specifically made a ruling
that would only include public employees who were providing testimony outside
of their ordinary duties (Lane v. Franks, 2014). The Court chose to limit their
decision to only these employees. Justice Thomas acknowledges this in his concurring opinion:
We accordingly have no occasion to address the quite different question
whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ when he testifies in the
course of his ordinary job responsibilities… For some public employees-such as police officers, crime scene technicians and laboratory analysts- testifying is a routine and critical part of their employment duties.
Others may be called to testify in the context of particular litigation as
the designated representatives of their employers… The Court properly
leaves the constitutional questions raised by these scenarios for another
day (Lane v. Franks, 2014).
By refusing to address all employee testimony, the Court only extended constitutional protection to a limited number of employees called to testify, and
essentially ignored employees who are required to put their faith into the justice
system on a constant and consistent basis. “…Public employees who testify as a
critical part of their employment duties should not be fearful that they could be
terminated or retaliated against for providing truthful sworn testimony” (Roberts
2007, p. 309).
First Amendment Constitutional protection should be afforded to all public
employees concerning sworn testimony regardless if the employee is providing
the testimony outside of the normal duties, or as part of their typical duties. The
Court should adopt a rule that states all testimonial speech is considered citizen
speech. Based on this undeniable categorization that all testimony is citizen
speech, each time a public employee takes the oath to tell the whole truth during
the course of a court proceeding, whether given as part of their official duties,
or outside their normal job functions, or as a representative of the employer, the
speech should unequivocally be considered citizen speech. This is not to say that
employers will have no recourse in terms of holding employees responsible for
the jobs they perform while providing the testimony. Based on a Court ruling in
favor of First Amendment protections for public employees who testify as part
of their job duties or on behalf of their employers, the public employer needs to
educate itself, as well as its employees on the legal precedent and on what speech
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can and will be called into question by the employer in order to maintain efficient
and effective operations. Public managers at all levels of administration need to
have a reasonable knowledge of Constitutional law in order to make decisions
that do not harm the Constitutional rights of public employees and citizens.
Public managers need to be able to utilize this knowledge to appropriately train
and inform their employees of what the employee’s rights and responsibilities
are in relation to their employment duties. By having a basic understanding
of Constitutional law, public employers will have direction on how to address
employee speech that the employer feels may be detrimental to its operations.
Employer’s will need to follow the guidelines set forth by the Connick court in
determining if the speech is a matter of public concern. Employers will need
to focus on the content, form, and context (Connick v. Myers, 1983) of the
speech to determine the public’s interest in the speech. If it is determined that
the speech is of public concern, the employer will then need to establish that
their interest as the employer in prohibiting the speech outweighs the employee’s
interest in speaking. Public employers have a right to run effective organizations,
however, employees, also have a right to be treated in a fair and transparent
manner. By declaring all testimonial speech to be citizen speech, one hurdle
can be removed in the employee/employer relationship concerning freedom of
speech rights of public employees.
As it stands now, the line between citizen and employee is blunt. “Future
employees who speak as citizens about a matter of public concern, but
concurrently speak pursuant to their official duties as employees will be beyond
the protection of the First Amendment” (Farley, 2007, p. 605). The Court
has failed to recognize that making a distinction between speech made as an
employee and speech made as a citizen is sometimes impossible, because they
are one in the same. Public employees do not give up their citizenship when they
enter into employment with the government. Public employees are, therefore,
also citizens that the government is accountable to. For the good of the
democracy, their speech made on matters of public concern should be protected
above all else.
Conclusion
Freedom of speech is not an absolute. The Supreme Court has made
rulings concerning the harmful nature of some types of speech. In the course
of these decisions, the Court has addressed the freedom of speech of public
employees in order to balance these rights with the needs of the government to
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operate as an employer. These decisions have attempted to balance the needs and
rights of the public employee and the public entity.
Pickering v. Board of Education created a test that, if left alone, would have
created a balance between employer and employee. However, in the subsequent
cases of Connick v. Myers and Garcetti v. Ceballos, the balance found in Pickering
was lost. Public employees now face retribution for speaking on matters of
public concern when they speak as employees, rather than citizens. “The First
Amendment, above all else, rejects laws that favor some ideas or viewpoints
while excluding others. Such laws limit the scope of the ‘marketplace of ideas’”
(Hudson, 2002, p. 3). The Supreme Court has ruled that despite the knowledge
and expertise public employees are equipped with, speech made as an employee
is unprotected under the First Amendment, and thus, they have created an
unbalanced system that will harm not only the public employee, but also the
general public and the rule of law.
Current case law continues to separate the public employee into two
categories: employee and citizen. It is time for the Court to recognize that this
dichotomy is not absolute. All citizens are required to provide truthful sworn
testimony. If providing testimony is the responsibility of all citizens, speech
made during the testimony must be afforded First Amendment protection
regardless of the employment position of the citizen giving the testimony. In
order to protect the integrity of the judicial system, and the accountability of
the government, public employees need to be able to provide sworn testimony
without fear of retaliation from their employers when the testimony is being
provided as a part of the official duties or simply as a citizen.
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